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The	productivity	gap	adds	to	the	concerns	about
how	Brexit	can	be	navigated
In	this	blog,	Iain	Begg	(LSE)	explains	why	the	low	expectations	of	the	trend	of	productivity	growth	in
the	UK,	published	by	the	Office	for	Budget	Responsibility,	add	to	the	concerns	about	how	Brexit	can
be	navigated.
Chancellors	usually	try	to	achieve	three	things	in	their	annual	budget	speeches:	setting	a	course	for
the	economy;	pulling	rabbits	from	their	hats	to	please	their	core	supporters,	in	and	out	of	the	political
bubble;	and	demonstrating	their	competence	and	prudent	stewardship	of	the	economy.
Philip	Hammond’s	rabbit	was	meant	to	be	his	package	of	measures	to	transform	Britain’s	dysfunctional	housing
market,	and	he	announced	a	number	of	initiatives	intended	to	improve	the	supply-side	of	the	economy,	with	the
underlying	aim	of	preparing	for	Brexit.
However,	both	were	overshadowed	in	the	headlines	by	the	down-grading	of	forecasts	for	GDP	growth.	The
slowing	of	the	economy	should	not	have	been	much	of	a	surprise,	because	it	had	already	become	evident	in	the
data	published	for	the	first	three	quarters	of	2017.	Even	so,	the	projections	of	growth	being	stuck	in	the	slow	lane
for	the	next	five	years	are	eye-catching.
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As	expected,	the	Office	for	Budget	Responsibility	(OBR	–	the	independent	fiscal	watchdog)	lowered	its
expectations	of	the	trend	of	productivity	growth.	Having	been	accused	of	being	of	being	too	optimistic	previously,
it	is	arguable	the	OBR	has	now	become	too	negative	about	productivity.
But	as	has	been	explained	previously,	the	UK’s	productivity	growth	–	the	key	to	increasing	prosperity	and
household	incomes	–	has	stagnated	in	the	last	decade	and	is	the	lowest	of	the	leading	industrial	nations.	Britain’s
productivity	level	is	also	well	below	that	of	major	competitors,	such	as	Germany	and	France.
Does	any	of	this	matter?	There	will	be	cynics	who	note	the	poor	track	record	of	economic	forecasters	and
therefore	seek	to	dismiss	the	OBR’s	projections.	But	at	a	time	when	the	global	economy	is	enjoying	steady
growth,	and	even	the	Eurozone	recovery	seems	to	be	gathering	pace,	it	is	disappointing	that	the	British	economy
is	not	doing	better.
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The	lower	growth	now	projected	for	the	next	five	years	can	only	add	to	the	concerns	about	how	Brexit	can	be
navigated.	The	initial	resilience	of	the	British	economy	following	the	referendum	stemmed	largely	from	the
strength	of	consumers’	expenditure,	but	rising	prices	and	low	wage	growth	are	making	it	harder	for	consumers	to
sustain	the	economy.
Unless	productivity	starts	to	pick	up,	allowing	employers	to	pay	more,	real	incomes	will	stagnate.	However,	the
UK	has	one	of	the	lowest	rates	of	investment	among	the	richer	economies,	and	without	growth	in	both	private	and
public	investment,	it	will	not	be	easy	to	boost	productivity.
Lower	growth	will	also	mean	further	pressures	on	already	shaky	public	finances,	because	tax	revenues	typically
increase	in	line	with	the	strength	of	the	economy.	Public	debt	will	be	higher	in	2020	than	previously	expected,
despite	a	redefinition	taking	housing	debts	off	the	public	balance	sheet.	If	there	are	further	rises	in	interest	rates,	it
will	gradually	cost	more	to	finance	the	debt.
Hidden	away	in	the	OBR	tables	is	an	estimate	that	the	government	deficit	will	be	an	average	of	£18	billion	higher
than	previously	expected	in	each	of	the	three	fiscal	years	following	Brexit:	2019-2021.	This	is	close	to	double	the
current	British	net	contribution	to	the	EU,	and	means	any	lingering	illusion	that	there	will	be	more	money	for	the
NHS	soon	must	be	dispelled.
We	also	have	to	add	in	the	cost	–	probably	spread	over	a	number	of	years	–	of	the	Brexit	divorce	bill	which
Ministers	are	grudgingly,	if	belatedly,	conceding	will	have	to	be	paid.	The	response	to	the	demand	from	NHS
head,	Simon	Stevens,	for	an	extra	£350	million	a	week	may	well,	to	coin	a	phrase,	have	to	be	‘go	whistle’.
Politically,	the	Chancellor	has	been	applauded	for	an	astute	budget,	for	avoiding	any	gaffes	and	for	offering
enough	to	the	Remainer	and	Brexiteer	factions	in	his	party	to	see	off	his	critics:	for	now,	the	verdict	seems	to	be
that	his	job	is	no	longer	under	threat.
But	let’s	be	clear:	even	without	any	direct	effects	of	Brexit,	the	British	economy	is	not	in	the	best	of	health	and	has
medium	and	longer-term	challenges	to	confront.	This	is	the	message	decision-makers	should	take	from	the
budget	and	factor	into	the	calculations	of	how	to	secure	the	best	Brexit	deal.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	LSE	Brexit	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.	It
first	appeared	on	The	UK	in	a	Changing	Europe.
Iain	Begg	is	Professorial	Research	Fellow	at	the	European	Institute	and	Co-Director	of	the	Dahrendorf	Forum,
London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science,	and	Senior	Fellow	on	the	UK	Economic	and	Social	Research
Council’s	initiative	on	The	UK	in	a	Changing	Europe.
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